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Abstract: A resilient electricity infrastructure is one which preserves continuity of
service despite perturbations in its environment, if it fails, it does so gracefully, not
catastrophically. Electricity infrastructures globally are undergoing a low-carbon
transition with a yet-to-be defined endpoint. What will be the impact of these
transitions on network resilience? How can we steer them to foster resilience? This
paper introduces results from a model exploring the evolution of the Dutch electricity
transmission network under various transition scenarios. The model captures the
development of this network as a result of the decisions of a set of boundedly rational
agents, representing power producers and a grid operator. These agents make
repeated decisions to (dis)invest in various types of infrastructure components,
driving the evolution of the network. Using network analysis techniques, we evaluate
the resilience of the resulting network topologies and identify key drivers of
resilience
Key words: Electricity infrastructure; Climate change; Vulnerability;
Simulation, Energy transitions.
I. Introduction
Electricity infrastructures are complex globe-spanning socio-technical systems whose
functionality depends on a relatively stable set of environmental conditions. As forcefully
demonstrated by events such as the 2012 blackouts in India (620 million people without power)
and Hurricane Sandy (8.5 million people without power), fluctuations in these conditions –
whether in the form of droughts, hurricanes or floods – can spark disturbances with potentially
devastating consequences. Insofar as climate change is anticipated to affect the frequency and
severity of weather extremes, it poses a potential threat to our electricity infrastructures, from
degrading their integrity and performance to inciting major blackouts.
Next to the emerging issue of electricity infrastructure vulnerability to climate change,
unabating societal concerns about the broader consequences of a changing climate are driving a
gradual shift in the global power sector from a reliance on fossil to renewable energy sources and
from carbon-intensive to low-carbon technologies. Further fueled by the privatization and
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vertical de-integration of the electricity supply chain1,2,3, and by technological developments in
the areas of renewable and distributed electricity generation, this transition will have far-reaching
and systemic impacts on the infrastructure as a whole4,5,6). How will a low-carbon transition
affect the vulnerability of our electricity infrastructures to climate change, and how can we
support the development of a climate-resilient electricity infrastructure?
The vulnerability of electricity infrastructures to climate change is influenced by both the
geographical configuration and topological structure of these systems. Systems with a large
proportion of key components situated in heavily exposed areas will likely be more vulnerable to
weather extremes, and structurally fragile systems will be more prone to amplify local
disturbances into network-wide blackouts. In this paper, we explore (1) the consequences of
various trajectories for a low-carbon transition on the geographical and topological features of an
electricity infrastructure, and (2) the relationship between these features and the vulnerability of
the infrastructure to certain types of extreme weather events that are anticipated to occur with
increasing frequency as a result of climate change.
This paper introduces preliminary results from a model assessing the vulnerability of the
Dutch electricity infrastructure to climate change, taking into account the various possible
development trajectories of the infrastructure over the coming decades. As a low-lying coastal
country located at the mouth of three major European rivers, the Netherlands is particularly
exposed to sea level rise and riverine flooding, as well as to wind storm losses and extreme
windspeeds7– all of which may significantly affect the performance of infrastructure
components. Moreover, the Dutch government has committed itself to a 20% reduction in carbon
emissions by 2020 and an 80% reduction by 2050. Meeting these targets will necessitate a largescale shift towards renewable and other low-carbon generation technologies and the realization
of a transmission/distribution system capable of seamlessly integrating these technologies and
continuously balancing supply and demand. While it is clear that a transition is necessary, we do
not know precisely what form the future infrastructure will take.
II. Positioning of the research
A growing body of research suggests that climate change is likely to influence the supply,
demand, transmission and distribution of electricity in myriad ways. Increases in mean air and
water temperatures and decreases in river flows are likely to affect the availability and efficiency
of thermal and hydropower generators8,9,10. Growth in the frequency and severity of windstorms
may increase the occurrence of downed overhead lines, and rising sea levels combined with
increased frequencies of extreme rain events may lead to periodic flooding of low-lying areas
and subsequent disruption of power substations. Higher average and extreme temperatures may
increase demand for air conditioning and refrigeration, possibly leading to long-term increases in
peak electricity loads11,12.
While a significant body of research has elaborated on various weather/climate sensitivities of
electricity infrastructure components, less is known about the vulnerability of infrastructure
networks as a whole. To address this gap, our work builds on research in the area of structural
vulnerability analysis of power networks. Central to this body of research is the notion of power
systems as complex networks in which failures may propagate nonlinearly through the network,

International Symposium for Next Generation Infrastructure
October 1-4, 2013, Wollongong, Australia
leading to critical thresholds in system performance. Beginning with a graph representation of an
abstract or real-world power network, studies in this area assess how the successive removal of
nodes/edges affects network performance13,14,15,16,17. This technique provides insight into patterns
of degradation in system performance resulting from successive component failures.
In addressing the issue of electricity infrastructure vulnerability to climate change, we extend
on this core approach of structural vulnerability analysis in several ways. First, we modify the
sequence of node/edge removal so as to reflect component sensitivities to certain types of
extreme weather conditions, specifically floods and windstorms. In this manner, we seek to
capture extreme weather-induced patterns of network degradation, producing insight into the
performance of the network under such conditions. Second, we test not a single network, but
multiple networks representing different development trajectories of the Dutch electricity
infrastructure. These networks reflect a range of possible futures, and are intended to capture
uncertainties concerning the endpoint of a low-carbon transition.
III. Approach
The purpose of the model described here is to assess the vulnerability of the Dutch electricity
infrastructure to climate change, and to identify options for supporting the development of a
climate-resilient electricity infrastructure. The model is composed of two submodels – a model
of infrastructure evolution and a model of infrastructure performance. The infrastructure
evolution submodel captures the long-term development of the Dutch electricity infrastructure
under various scenarios, while the infrastructure performance submodel assesses the climate
vulnerability of these “evolved” infrastructures.
Infrastructure evolution submodel: The starting point for the infrastructure evolution
submodel is a dataset describing the current configuration of the Dutch electricity infrastructure,
including generation and transmission/distribution. Four scenarios (plus a baseline) are used to
describe the development of the generation portfolio over a period of 40 years. These scenarios
(Table 1) have been selected to reflect a range of possible development trajectories for the Dutch
generation portfolio.
Scenario
Centralized
generation
Distributed
generation
Offshore
wind
Import
Baseline

Description
Continued growth in large, centralized, fossil-based generation facilities.
Geographical consolidation of generation.
Rapid expansion of renewables-based distributed generation, spread evenly
across distribution grids. Commensurate growth in centralized generation to
compensate for renewables intermittency.
Rapid expansion of offshore wind in predefined North Sea locations.
Commensurate growth in centralized fossil-based generation to compensate
for intermittency.
Gradual flattening in the growth of domestic supply, compensated by an
increase in supply by neighboring countries
Infrastructure remains unchanged from its current state.
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Table 1. Supply scenarios for the infrastructure evolution submodel
The core of the infrastructure evolution model is an algorithm representing the decision
making procedures of the Dutch transmission system operator (TSO) with respect to investments
in new transmission capacity. Design criteria for the real-world Dutch transmission grid are laid
out in the so-called Grid Code18, established by the Dutch Electricity Act of 1998. To ensure
compliance with these criteria, the Dutch TSO carries out annual evaluations of the transmission
grid19. These analyses serve as a basis for the determination of necessary capacity upgrades. A
simplified version of the TSO’s assessment procedure guides capacity upgrades of transmission
system components in the infrastructure evolution submodel. Each timestep during the course of
a simulation (one timestep = one year), an algorithm performs a set of contingency analyses
under peak demand conditions for a set of four scenarios with varying geographical distributions
of generation dispatch and imports/exports. As a result of these analyses, necessary capacity
investments are initialized to keep the system in line with the requirements of the Dutch Grid
Code.
Infrastructure performance submodel: The infrastructure performance submodel assesses the
performance of the Dutch electricity infrastructure under various types of extreme weather
conditions that may be expected to occur with increasing frequency as a consequence of climate
change. This assessment takes the form of a structural vulnerability analysis modified to reflect
certain effects of these extreme weather conditions. For each of the topologies generated by the
infrastructure evolution submodel – one for each scenario representing the final (2050) state of
the infrastructure – the model executes two analyses. The first analysis involves the successive
removal of random power lines, with the removal of each line followed by an assessment of
network performance. The second analysis involves the successive removal of substations, also
followed in each case by a performance assessment. Network performance is defined as the ratio
of power delivered to power demanded. In calculating network performance, the model takes
into account the possibility for cascading failures, which are an important aspect of power
system vulnerability, and have played a role in some of the most notorious blackouts in recent
years20,21.
The model captures the vulnerability of infrastructure components to two types of extreme
weather conditions – flood events and windstorms. We have chosen to incorporate vulnerabilities
to these types of extreme weather conditions given both their anticipated role in the context of
climate change22,23,24 and their potential to affect power system performance. Vulnerabilities of
infrastructure components to both floods and windstorms are represented by adjusting the
probability of component failure in the structural vulnerability analysis. In the case of flood
events, the probability of substation failure depends on the elevation of the substation, and in the
case of windstorms, the probability of line failure is proportional to line length. Failure
probabilities do not currently account for adaptation measures such as dikes or pylon designs that
may provide added protection to certain components.
IV. Key Results
Figure 1 illustrates key results from the infrastructure performance model, based on the
averaged results of 100 simulation runs. In the tests of both flood and windstorm vulnerability,

International Symposium for Next Generation Infrastructure
October 1-4, 2013, Wollongong, Australia
important differences can be seen in the patterns of performance degradation across the tested
scenarios. In the windstorm analysis, the networks in most scenarios exhibit convex performance
degradation – a sharp initial drop in performance followed by decelerating degradation with
further failures. This pattern can be attributed largely to the centralized nature of production in
these scenarios – by 2050 most supply is situated in a handful of coastal areas, resulting in a
situation in which the failure of a few key lines can significantly cripple system performance.
The distributed generation scenario produces a very different result. In this case, the network
exhibits slightly concave performance degradation, which can be attributed both to the
decentralized nature of production and to the greater capacity of lines relative to the centralized
and import scenarios. The decentralized nature of production means fewer “critical" lines whose
failure engenders a plummet in system performance. Greater line capacities mean fewer failure
cascades, since remaining lines are able to better handle the extra burdens of successive line
failures.

Figure 1. Windstorm and flood vulnerability for the different scenarios, based on the results of the
infrastructure performance model.

The flood performance analysis exhibits similar behavior. In this case, we see a maximum
performance degradation of 50-60% in the centralized, import and offshore wind scenarios,
resulting from the successive failure of 114 substations situated less than one meter above sea
level. The distributed generation scenario performs better, with less than a 40% drop in
performance under similar conditions. It is important to note that the smoothness of these
averaged results conceals highly nonlinear behavior that may occur in individual runs. In some
cases the failure of a single line or substation can cause a drop in network performance of 1020% as the network reaches a critical threshold. These critical thresholds may be reached sooner
or later, depending on the sequence in which lines or substations fail.
V. Discussion and Conclusions
The results suggest that a future Dutch infrastructure based around distributed generation may
help to mitigate electricity infrastructure vulnerability to climate change. However, this does not
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imply that a system based around more centralized generation is inevitably less resilient. The
results suggest that much degradation in system performance arises from sudden and periodic
large drops in network performance when the system reaches a critical threshold. Adaptation
measures such as demand-side management and generation redispatch – which have been
excluded from this analysis – could be employed in real time to alleviate stress within the
network as these thresholds are approached. Harder measures such as dikes and pylon
reinforcements can also help to inhibit the buildup of component failures. Future research will
explore the potential benefits of such options and will explore the consequences of key
assumptions underlying the presented model.
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